Percations reguarding a biological terrorism attack in florida.
Since the 11 September attacks, much of the literature on terror has focused on the psychology of terrorism rather than on identifying attacks that may occur. While the psychology of terrorists is important, it doesn’t do much to help those responsible for defending against terrorist acts. One thing should be remembered: terrorists, whoever they may be (Middle Eastern, Asian, European, or domestic), will use whatever tools are most suitable that they’re trained to use and are available.
Since the 11 September attacks, much of the literature on terror has focused on the psychology of terrorism rather than on identifying attacks that may occur. While the psychology of terrorists is important, it doesn’t do much to help those responsible for defending against terrorist acts. One thing should be remembered: terrorists, whoever they may be (Middle Eastern, Asian, European, or domestic), will use whatever tools are most suitable that they’re trained to use and are available.
Since 11 September, much has been done to bolster defenses in the United States. These steps have focused on such sites as airports, tunnels, and bridges. Consequently, these types of sites have become hard targets, a fact of which terrorists are well aware. Even so, the question is whether those focusing on these hard targets are focusing on the areas in which we truly are vulnerable.
Methodology
We came to the conclusion that to meaningfully identify potential domestic terrorist attacks, we would need to look at relatively small geographic areas (for example, county by county) rather than at the nation. For this reason we selected Charlotte County, FL, for testing the effectiveness of our Terrorist Target Selection and Prioritization Model. The county is devoid of strategic targets. People who live there, like those in many other areas of the United States, go about their business every day without being particularly concerned about terrorist attacks. Charlotte County3 has approximately 150,000 residents; 35% are age 65 or older. County government and medical and health providers are the leading employment segments, along with the varied retail industry. The county has another interesting and distinguishing feature: it accommodated several of the 11 September terrorists. Mohammed Atta visited restaurants, facilitated overseas cash transfers, and sought aid in a local hospital there. It is reasonable to assume that the county is well known to al-Qaeda planners.
To identify potential terrorist attacks in Charlotte County, we created a team of eight “terror planners” (the authors of this article) with backgrounds in physics-math, psychology, infectious disease, radiation oncology, emergency room medicine, emergency management, environmental health planning, and senior levels of the U.S. military.
For any given terrorist event (such as a biological attack at a shopping mall), terrorists could choose to carry it out in dozens of ways. To provide a look into the thinking of terrorists, we developed three scenarios for carrying out some of the 14 events.
Scenario 1: Vehicle bomb attack, then chemical attack, at a major festival.
Objective: To stage a terrorist attack in Charlotte County, FL, that will kill many and maim many more and thus instill hysteria.
Strategy: A truck bomb attack followed immediately by a chemical attack.
Scenario 2: Vehicle bomb attack, then a chemical attack at a major shopping mall.
Objective: To stage an attack that will convince the American public that government is powerless to protect them.
Objective: To stage an attack that will convince the American public that government is powerless to protect them.
Strategy: A vehicle bomb attack will be used to cover an even more deadly chemical attack.
Scenario 3: Biological attacks in hospitals followed by suicide bomber attacks in a popular shopping mall.
Objective: To paralyze the state of Florida and have an impact on the entire United States.
Strategy: To surreptitiously attack a key industry—health care—and overtly attack the retail industry.
Conclusions
Starting with no a priori beliefs as to what terrorists might undertake, we were able to use the mode to cost-effectively identify and prioritize what terrorists might undertake within the county. By knowing what constitutes high-priority potential targets, those responsible for the at-risk entities (hospitals, festivals, etc.) have the opportunity to implement countermeasures designed to avoid (or reduce the severity of) terrorist attacks.
Not only political or military entities may become targets of terrorist attacks. Consider Illinois State University, with 22-story twin dormitories in which over 2,000 students reside, and State Farm Insurance Company’s national headquarters a mile or so away. It would make sense for planners in such entities to assess their vulnerabilities to terrorist acts but, unfortunately, they probably aren’t doing so. As Joshua Sinai indicated, as a nation, we don’t suffer from intelligence failures so much as from failures in imagination.
Recommendations
Because it is both effective and cost-efficient, the Stungis-Schori Terrorist Target Selection and Prioritization Model should be widely used by federal, state, county, and city governments and other entities to assess vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.
If the methodology we used in Charlotte County is faithfully followed in assessing other entities, the resulting terrorist alert scores will be useful in comparing the vulnerabilities in one entity with those in another. In Charlotte County, a terrorist alert score of 3.0 is the point at which one should start developing countermeasures, as opposed to ignoring the threats.
citited from:George E. Stungis and Thomas R. Schori, “A Terrorist Target Selection and Prioritization Model,” Journal of Homeland Security, March 2003.
2. Joshua Sinai, “How to Forecast and Preempt al-Qaeda’s Catastrophic Terrorist Warfare,” Journal of Homeland Security, August 2003.
3. Robert Carpenter, Charlotte County, Florida, Statistical Prospectus, 2002-2003 edition, Charlotte County Chamber of Commerce, Punta Gorda, FL.
4. G.A.V. Borg and L. E. Marks, “Twelve Meanings of the Measure Constant in Psychological Power Functions,” Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, vol. 21, pp. 73-75, 1983.
2. Joshua Sinai, “How to Forecast and Preempt al-Qaeda’s Catastrophic Terrorist Warfare,” Journal of Homeland Security, August 2003.
3. Robert Carpenter, Charlotte County, Florida, Statistical Prospectus, 2002-2003 edition, Charlotte County Chamber of Commerce, Punta Gorda, FL.
4. G.A.V. Borg and L. E. Marks, “Twelve Meanings of the Measure Constant in Psychological Power Functions,” Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, vol. 21, pp. 73-75, 1983.
